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COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE GENERAL THEORY
OF SECOND BEST IN LAW AND ECONOMICS

INTRODUCTION

Law and economics has thrived by applying microeconomic theory, particularly the insights of welfare economics, to the analysis of
legal rules, processes, and institutions. The core recognition of law

and economics is that legal rules can correct market imperfections,
such as monopoly and the presence of external costs and benefits.
Antitrust law and the regulation of natural monopolies, such as telecommunications (in the past) and water supply, were the early manifestations of this recognition.' The more modern insights of law and
economics result from the perception that private law areas such as
property, contract, and tort can correct market imperfections, or more
generally, encourage the efficient use of social resources. For example, an economic analyst would favor the general protection of intel-

lectual property to correct for the public-good nature of information
1. The early influence of economics in each of these areas of the law was particularized
and not the thorough, comprehensive treatment that characterizes the modern law-and-economics literature. In antitrust law, economics was useful for such tasks as defining the social virtues
of competition, enumerating the social costs of collusion, and characterizing the hallmarks of
competitive markets. An older generation of antitrust scholars made only this particularized use
of economics. See, e.g., PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES
(1981). A more modern generation of antitrust scholars sees the field more comprehensively
through the lens of economics. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976) (expressing sympathy for the use of economics in antitrust jurisprudence);
STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW (1993) (indicating less sympathy). Law and
economics counts the revolution in antitrust law in the 1970s as one of its significant early successes in influencing the law.
In the governmental regulation of natural monopolies, economics was useful to an earlier
generation in providing a thorough justification of the special status of natural monopoliesnamely that declining average and marginal costs over the relevant range of output make it
unlikely, if not impossible, for competition to flourish in those industries; rather, it is economically most efficient for production to be in the hands of a single producer. The generation and
distribution of water and electricity and of telecommunications services are examples of natural
monopolies. For a classic treatment, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970), (2 vols.).
Law and economics also counted its influence on the federal deregulation of industry in the
late 1970s as another significant accomplishment. The arguments for deregulation had two different components. One was to point out that there were some regulated industries, such as the
airlines, which had never been natural monopolies and should never have been regulated, at
least on that ground. Another was to point out that there were other regulated industries, such
as telecommunications and, more recently, electricity distribution, that had been natural monopolies under an older technology but were, under newer technologies, competitive industries for
which traditional rate-of-return regulation was no longer appropriate. See generally STEPHEN G.
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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and encourage the investment of real resources in the production and
dissemination in inventive and creative activity.
Neither private nor public law economic analysts, however, have
paid much attention to a well-known proposition in welfare economics
known as the General Theory of Second Best (the "theory"). 2 That
theory suggests that the seriatim correction of market imperfections
will not necessarily improve overall social welfare. 3 Indeed, the the-

ory holds that piecemeal correction, or correction of a subset of the
imperfections, might reduce social well-being. 4 The only circumstance

in which the correction of market imperfections will inevitably improve social welfare is that in which society simultaneously corrects all
of the imperfections. 5 The clear implication of the theory for poli-

cymaking is that one ought to do nothing unless one can do
everything.
Law and economics is not alone in ignoring the General Theory
of Second Best. Economists, too, have generally paid little attention

to the theory. For example, most modern intermediate and graduate
microeconomics text do not even mention the theory. 6 The reason for
this is not that they have discovered a fatal flaw in the theory; rather,

they simply do not believe it, or if they do, choose to act as if it is a
figment of the ivory tower with little practical application. This curious selectivity, in which a learned profession chooses to believe some,
but not all, of the results in the field, is a subject far beyond my abili7
ties to explain.
Professor Richard Markovits has almost single-handedly shown
the potentially devastating implications of the General Theory of Sec8
ond Best for the general claim of efficiency in law and economics.
2. For the classic article, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). For a recent review of literature following this article,
see WELFARE ECONOMICS OF THE SECOND BEST (Dieter Bos & Christian Seidl eds., 1986).

3. See Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 2, at 17.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 11.
6. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990); HAL R.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MIRCROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH (4th ed. 1996).

7. I, like most economists, clearly recognize the anomaly of the theory's reception in economics and am aware of how little I have, heretofore, chosen to take it seriously.
8. Professor Richard Markovits has explored the implications of that theory-and, indeed,
has made substantial advances in the theory itself-in a series of articles. See Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of "The Effect
of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, The Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
485 (1993); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly
Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative Stories,
78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993); Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of
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Thus far, the mainstream of law and economics has not responded.
But it should: the criticisms of the theory are serious and deserve
careful consideration. I try to begin that response in this Article.
I open with a brief overview of the connections between welfare
economics, the theory of market imperfections, and the analysis of
legal rules. I then briefly summarize the theory and show its implications for economic policy generally and law and economics specifically. I conclude by discussing how law and economics should take
account of the insights of the theory in the future.
II.

FIRST BEST IN LAW AND ECONOMICS

In this section, I show that in the absence of market imperfections
there is no particular case to be made for legal intervention into private decisionmaking on the basis of efficiency. (An alternative case
for intervention might be made, for instance, on the basis of distributive justice.) Rather, where there are no imperfections, private bargaining can achieve efficient outcomes without help. Then I show that
when there are market imperfections, legal rules can correct the inefficiencies that arise from these imperfections.
A.

Welfare Economics, Imperfections, and the Economic Analysis
of Law

Welfare economics considers the ability of markets to achieve allocative (or "Pareto") and productive efficiency. 9 According to the
First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, perfectly competitive markets will lead to allocatively efficient outcomes.' 0 There are,
however, identifiable circumstances that prevent markets from achieving Pareto-optimal outcomes: market power (i.e., monopoly and monopsony), external costs and benefits (i.e., costs or benefits
involuntarily imposed or conferred upon third parties by the utility or
profit-maximizing activities of others), public goods (i.e., goods for
which the costs of excluding non-paying beneficiaries are so high that
no profit-regarding supplier will be able to supply them in the optimal
First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and
Some Therefores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 316 (1996).
9. Allocative efficiency obtains when it is impossible to reallocate holdings of goods and
services so as to make some people better off without making other people worse off. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1997). Productive efficiency
holds if it is impossible to reallocate inputs among productive processes so as to produce a
greater total output (or to produce the same amount of total output by means of fewer inputs).
See id. at 11-12.
10. See KREps, supra note 6, at 286-87; VARIAN, supra note 6, at 490-93.
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amount to the market), and severe informational asymmetries (i.e.,
the possession of information by one party that is of great value to the
other party but that the first party, for reasons of strategic behavior,
will not reveal to the second party).
Normative economic policy analysis identifies market imperfections and recommends corrections for those imperfections. For example, if market power prevents market efficiency, then the correction is
to make that market more competitive by, for example, directly regulating output price, encouraging entry into the market, and breaking
up the existing monopoly into rival parts." An earlier phase of law
and economics concentrated on taxation, governmental regulation of
natural monopolies, and antitrust, in large part because the application of welfare economics in those fields was straightforward. 12 As
first applied to the analysis of law, this framework served the early
phase of law and economics well.
Since Professor Coase first offered his famous theorem, 13 however, the method by which welfare economics has been used to examine the law has changed. I refer not so much to the fact that Coase
turned the analysis from the traditional areas of interaction between
economics and law noted above, but more importantly for present
purposes, to the fact that the style of analysis changed. Coase (and the
literature that developed in explication of the Coase Theorem) 14 began the analysis with the clear identification of transaction costs rather
than market imperfections.' 5 There is, of course, a correspondence
between the notions of market imperfections and transactions costs: I
believe Coase intended the category of transaction costs to encompass
all the sources of market imperfection, or "all things that prevent people from achieving their ends through voluntary exchange."
As a result of Coase's innovation, law and economics now begins
its analysis of any legal rule or institution by identifying the impediments to a voluntary bargaining solution to potential or actual
problems. If the impediments are minimal, then there is probably no
11. For the general economic argument about market imperfections and policy correctives,
see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 38-41.
12. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 1-2; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 20-21 (4th ed. 1992).

13. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase Theorem
holds that if transaction costs are zero (i.e., if the costs of effectuating a bargain are zero), then
resources will be used efficiently, regardless of the assignment of legal rights. See id.
14. For a review of that literature, see generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 79-93.
15. See Coase, supra note 13, at 28-42.
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need for social or legal intervention into private decisionmaking. 16
Replacing the language of "perfect markets, ' 17 this alternative analysis stresses that Pareto-optimal outcomes will occur when the costs of
effectuating bargains are so low that, whenever there is a cooperative
surplus that could be split between any two potential transactors, they
will find a means of splitting the surplus and thereby mutually benefiting. It follows that the law should intervene only when transaction
costs frustrate a bargain solution to resource allocation. My point
here is a simple one: the economic analysis of law is a straightforward
application of welfare economics to the non-market setting of the law,
substituting the concept "transaction costs" for that of "market imperfections." I shall return to an example shortly.
B.

The Non-Uniqueness of Pareto Optimality

One might think that the application of welfare economics to policy and to law and economics would, if done appropriately, lead to a
unique Pareto optimum. That is, wise and well-meaning analysts
could identify the market imperfections (or sources of high transaction costs) and apply the correctives to reach one and only one
Pareto-efficient allocation of goods and services. From that point one
could alter resource holdings to achieve whatever distributional state
18
the analyst desired.
In terms of law, this view implies that there is one set of legal
rules (and institutions) that would be first-best or Pareto-efficient. We
might be willing to hedge that conclusion and say that this uniquely
efficient set of legal rules would be true only for a specific jurisdiction,
given its resources, technology, citizens' tastes, history, and so on.
That is, we need not go so far as to suggest that welfare economics or
transaction-cost analysis posits that there is one set of efficient legal
16. Indeed, third-party intervention might frustrate private bargaining, by, for example,
causing actors inefficiently to spend resources getting around the third-party-imposed
constraints.
17. The replacement of that category is appropriate in the economic analysis of law because
many of the matters on which the law focuses are non-market transactions.
18. This separation of efficiency and equity concerns is a common one in welfare economics. In fact, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics implies that public policy
solutions to social problems should make this separation rather than seek to use, for example,
price regulation to achieve distributional goals. See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 517-19. Thus, the
Second Fundamental Theorem criticizes ceilings on rental rates for apartments as confounding
efficiency and equity. Instead, the separation theorists would recommend very little regulation
of rental rates so as to foster efficiency in the rental and closely related housing markets combined with income supplements for those burdened by housing costs.
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rules for all societies or even for every sub-region of a particular
society.
Even this circumscribed view would be mistaken. It is important
to be clear about why it is mistaken. Certainly there will be reasonable differences of opinion about whether or not some situation is a
market imperfection that needs correction, or whether or not transaction costs are so high as to make out a case for legal intervention.
Furthermore, even if there is agreement about which situations are
inefficient and need correction, there may be reasonable differences
about the most appropriate method of intervention in order to
achieve efficiency. Of course, those (and other pertinent) differences
will exist. But more importantly, even if we agree on what counts as
an imperfection or transaction cost and what the appropriate correctives are, there will still be no unique efficient outcome for a given
economy. In terms of law, even for a specific jurisdiction there is no
uniquely efficient set of laws. There is, as economists were once wont
to say, no optimum optimorum. This is a well-known result among
economists: in any given economy there is no uniquely optimal distribution of goods and services. 19 Allocative efficiency is an inherently
contingent concept, one that crucially depends on the initial endowment positions of the participants in the economy. 20 Each different
initial endowment will result in a different Pareto-optimal (or allocatively efficient) outcome so that there are as many Pareto-optimal outcomes as there are distinct initial endowments.
The fact that we are unable to specify an optimum optimorum has
not brought the welfare analysis of economics to its knees. Economists have long sought a method for detecting which among the many
allocatively efficient outcomes is best, but they have not thus far succeeded. 21 Instead, the field sets distributional issues to one side and
carries on with the welfare analysis. That is, all our prescriptions for
allocative efficiency are best only in the constrained sense that we are
19. See VARIAN, supra note 6, at 499-501.
20. See id. at 496-98.
21. The story is familiar to any student of microeconomic theory. As indicated, there are
many Pareto-efficient allocations, and economists have sought to discover a method of choosing
which among them is best. The core issue is discovering a method of aggregating individual
preferences over social outcomes into societal preferences. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
holds that there is no method of so aggregating individual preferences that does not violate one
or more of five very simple characteristics that an aggregation method ought to have (such as
that no one person's preferences should always determine society's preferences). See KErNETH
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1964). For a modem introduction
to the literature on social choice, see generally JOHN CRAVEN, SOCIAL CHOICE: A FRAMEWORK
FOR COLLECTIVE DECISIONS AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGEMENTS (1992).
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fully aware that we are leaving something out-namely, the distributional consequences of a different endowment. There is a sense in
which this constraint should not be so troubling. It embodies the postmodern notion that everything is highly contextualized. First-best and
uniquely optimal results are classroom exercises, not guides to the real
world. History, political possibility, geography, custom, and all the
other details matter too much to be ignored. There is no need to speculate on how things might have been if we had been able to start with
a clean slate.
I have digressed to point out this standard result from welfare
economics to stress the uncertainty and unavoidable indefiniteness at
the heart of the welfare implications of modern microeconomics. This
is, I believe, a very important point to make in light of the topic of this
Article. As I later point out, one of the criticisms of the General Theory of Second Best has always been that it brings analysis to a halt.
By asserting that a correction of an imperfection does not necessarily
increase social welfare, the theory makes one skeptical of the advisability of any corrective. And yet correctives continue, as does the academic consideration of their utility. By analogy, the recognition that
there is no unique Pareto optimum, only contingently optimal allocative efficiency, has not stopped the search for more efficient and more
just states of the world. The willingness to soldier on in the face of
this ambiguity is laudable; in any case, a policy of doing nothing to
make the economy and society more efficient would be otiose.
C. Legal Intervention on the Basis of Transaction Costs
The argument above illustrates that we need legal intervention in
private decisionmaking only when we find what traditional analysis
calls "market imperfections" and what law and economics calls "transaction costs." The relationship between this observation and the standard results in law and economics are so well known that I shall not
dwell on them here. 22 Rather, I shall very briefly indicate the connection between transaction costs and a corrective legal rule.
1. The Coase Theorem
We have seen
will bargain to the
plus when the cost
private bargaining

that the Coase Theorem holds that private parties
mutually satisfactory division of a cooperative surto them of effectuating this b
6argain is low. That is,
is the most appropriate means of allocating soci-

22. For a thorough discussion, see

COOTER

&

ULEN,

supra note 9, at 87-89.
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ety's scarce resources (by comparison to social or third-party allocation) when transaction costs are low. Law does not need to intervene
in private decisionmaking where that decisionmaking is likely to be
efficient. Utilizing the Coase Theorem to analyze the law consists of
no more than skillfully recognizing the factors that lead to high transaction costs. These factors include such things as the number of people involved in bargaining and the uniqueness or fungibility of the
item or performance at issue. Once identified, in theory an appropriate legal rule can correct for the high transaction cost.
2.

Contract law

Consider contract law, which concerns the enforceability of consensual agreements and the appropriate remedies for the non-performance of those agreements. What role does "transaction costs"
play in explaining the issues of enforceability and remedy? Law and
economics will generally intervene with private bargaining to foster
more efficient agreements by helping parties to do things that they
cannot do for themselves. 23 For example, consider that consensual
agreements typically require the parties to forego other profitable opportunities until they fully perform their promises. Such a binding
commitment is a tricky matter. In principle, both parties are better off
making the commitment than not; otherwise, they would not be involved in this particular consensual agreement. However, it may turn
out that one or both are even better off making the commitment and
then breaking it.24 If both parties recognize that there may be an incentive to make commitments that will turn out to be more valuable
in the breach than in the keeping, they must take steps to reduce any
incentive to break the commitment. That is, they must make these
commitments credible.
Perhaps they can do so by themselves. They might, for instance,
leave sums of money with a third party (a form of surety bond) that
would be forfeit to the innocent party if one should break his commitment to perform the promise. Or the parties might exchange hostages
and agree to forfeit them in the event of non-performance. Short of
these devices, parties wishing to enter into consensual agreements
could invest resources to establish a reputation as a trustworthy person, a reputation that would suffer from an opportunistic breach of
the commitment. But while such methods are hypothetically avail23. See id. at 180-85
24. See id. at 168-71.
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able, they are expensive, both directly and in terms of opportunity
cost. These costs may even be so high that they would discourage
contract formation.
Law can help foster efficient consensual agreements by establishing a set of rules that will reduce the costs of forming and enforcing
those agreements. These rules could specify how, when, with whom,
and under what circumstances one may form such an agreement, what
substantive terms are allowable, and the remedies that will be available to the innocent party if the other party breaks the agreement.
These default rules, as they are called, may be modified by the parties
within broad boundaries and allow the parties to specify (within limits) the damages for which they will be responsible in the event of
non-performance. Other rules may be immutable, such as a rule that
forbids enforcing a consensual agreement against someone who is not
mentally competent to make agreements. Or they may be rules that a
court will apply if the parties cannot themselves resolve a dispute
within the terms of the contract, such as a rule that requires the innocent party to perform specifically. All of these rules may be generally
characterized as rules to which the parties themselves would have
agreed if the costs of transacting were low. 25 I leave for a future section the consideration of a particular contractual rule in light of this
general formulation.
3. Tort law
Consider also tort law, which from an economic standpoint concerns the efficient allocation of costs arising from accidents. If one
stranger injures another accidentally and there is no law that specifies
who is responsible for those injuries, there is no compelling incentive
for the injurer to compensate the victim. Perhaps more importantly,
there is no ex ante incentive for the potential injurer to take care not
25. This is the emerging consensus in law and economics about contract rules. See COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 9, at 161-202; Symposium on Default Rules and ContracturalConsent, 3 S.
CAL. J. INTERDisc. L. 1 (1993). The dominant view is that the default rules mimic what the
parties themselves would have agreed to under low transaction costs. But there is another view
of default rules (a supplementary, not substitute view) under which the law should design some
default rules to solve severe informational asymmetries between the contracting parties. Thus,
the rule would impose a penalty on one party for failing to disclose something material to the
other party. An example is the rule from Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854),
under which the failure to disclose special losses arising from breach precludes the innocent
party from recovering anything more than the reasonably foreseeable losses from breach. See
generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
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to impose the injuries in the first place. The costs of taking care would
be an out-of-pocket or opportunity cost borne by the potential injurer
with no clear payoff. Therefore, rational potential injurers would not
take care.
Can private parties correct this state of affairs themselves? Potential victims might contract with potential injurers to take additional
care (preventing or lessening the severity of accidental losses),

thereby avoiding accident losses. Victims should be willing to pay injurers a portion of the sum that they would save from not being injured; injurers should be willing to accept a sum from victims that is
greater than the cost of purchasing precaution. 26 Under these terms,
both parties are better off than they would be by simply letting accidents happen and the costs fall where they may.
The problem is that such exchanges between potential victims

and injurers are obviously too expensive to take place in many circumstances. Consider, for instance, that one does not know with whom
one ought to transact in order to receive the contractual protection.
Even aside from the costs of identifying all those parties with whom
one ought to make an agreement, there may be holdouts or free rid-

ers. Many potential victims-let us assume that they can so identify
themselves-would like to have someone else contract with the potential injurers to take care, on the theory that they will be the beneficiaries of the precaution taken by the injurers, even though they did

not pay for it.27 Potential injurers (again assuming that they can so
identify themselves) would be reluctant to enter into individual agreements to take care if there were costs of distinguishing among those
victims entitled to precaution and those not so entitled; they would
rather hold out to conclude an agreement with all the potential victims

whom they might injure. These and other likely conditions make private consensual agreements between potential injurers and victims a

26. One can imagine far more complicated situations for these hypothetical transactions,
such as one in which the parties are not sure whether they are going to be a victim or an injurer.
For a favorable review of the possibilities of a contractual method of dealing with accidents
between strangers, see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L.
REv. 383 (1989).
27. Of course, this free riding is not likely to occur if the precaution can be taken specifically with respect to an identifiable victim. This is not an impossible state of affairs to imagine,
but it is unlikely in the real world. Moreover, there are secondary problems that arise in a
regime in which victims provide precaution tailored only to those with whom they have contracted. Consider, for instance, the problem of finding a way for those who have contracted for
the injurer's precaution to identify themselves in such a way as to prevent counterfeit identification by non-contracting potential victims.
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highly unlikely means of reducing the probability and severity of
accidents.
Law can correct this problem by creating a set of rules designed
to minimize the social costs of accidents, which include the precaution,
accident, and administrative costs. 2 8 Tort liability creates an incentive
for potential victims and injurers to internalize the costs of accidents.
By holding out the possibility of imposing liability on the injurer (or
not, in which case the accident losses become the responsibility of the
victim or of her insurer), tort law seeks to induce parties to take all
cost-justified precaution-i.e., to take precaution up to the point at
which the marginal cost of the last unit of precaution taken equals its
marginal benefit (which is itself equal to the reduction in the expected
costs of the accident). 29 I leave for discussion in a section below the
consideration of a particular tort liability issue in light of this general
formulation.
4.

Public law

Public law is a vast area that encompasses crime, constitutional
law, administrative law, corporation law, bankruptcy law, labor law,
and more. Those areas have received substantial treatment in the lawand-economics literature, 30 but because I shall draw below what I
think is an important distinction between the manner in which private
and public law treat issues of second best, we should have an example
of the economic analysis of a public law topic before us.
Law and economics has only a sketchily developed theory of
when to deal with a market imperfection or transaction-cost problem
by means of public law rather than by means of private law. 31 Generally, law-and-economics theory treats public law and private law as
interchangeable means to achieve social ends; society should choose
the cheaper of those substitute methods of solving the social problem
28. On this formulation of the economic goal of tort liability, see Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
29. The expected cost of an accident is equal to its probability of occurring times the losses
that will be imposed if the accident occurs. This is, of course, the modem formulation of the
famous Hand Rule from United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
For an extended discussion of the application of this rule, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at
281-83.
30. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL'Y
& ECON. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193 (1985). For a law-and-economics treatment of corporation law, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
31. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIvEs: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 98-122 (1994).
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at hand. 32 Consider, for instance, the issue of automobile safety. We
might define socially optimal automobiles as those for which the marginal cost of providing the last unit of precaution in the car are equal
to the marginal benefit of the precaution provided. Installing armor
plating on the sides of an automobile would not, therefore, be optimal
if the cost of installing and maintaining that plating (including the increased cost of operating the car because of its increased weight) exceeded the benefit (which would include the reduction in the
likelihood of an accident and in the severity of injuries to those riding
in the car).
Society can hope to induce manufacturers and consumers of
automobiles to produce and purchase socially optimal automobiles in
one of several very general ways. First, it might rely entirely on the
market. That is, one might argue that the transaction costs between
manufacturers and consumers of determining the appropriate amount
of safety to build into a car are so low that there is no warrant for
intervention into this private decisionmaking. 33 For example, if consumers perceive that the costs of passenger-side airbags exceed their
benefits, they will not purchase them, and therefore manufacturers
will not put them in every car. Because some consumers may perceive
that those airbags are worth the increased cost of the car so equipped,
manufacturers may want to offer those airbags as an optional
purchase on their models of automobile. Notice that, under the assumption that many consumers perceive that the costs of airbags exceed the benefits, it would be socially wasteful to compel them to
purchase passenger-side airbags.
Suppose, by contrast, that there are good reasons for believing
that the transaction costs between manufacturers and consumers are
so high that some cost-justified safety devices will not be produced
and purchased. What legal corrective will induce the production and
sale of these precautions? Private law might come into play by allowing those injured in automobile accidents to sue the manufacturer
for negligence in not producing a more crashworthy car. If in the relevant jurisdiction the courts hold that it is negligent to produce an automobile without all those safety devices whose marginal benefits
32. For a discussion of the economic issues in choosing between administrative agency regulation and tort liability, see Charles Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety
Regulation: Substitutes or Compliments?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888 (1990). For an application of
these matter to automobile safety, see generally JERRY L. MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY (1990).
33. In the alternative formulation there is no market imperfection that needs correction.
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exceed their marginal costs, then rational manufacturers will begin to
produce cars that incorporate all such safety devices. Moreover, when
technology causes the costs of newer safety devices to fall or changes
in medical technology cause the benefits of some safety devices to
rise, automobile manufacturers will have the appropriate incentives to
incorporate new safety into automobiles.
Alternatively, society could deal with high transaction costs be-

tween automobile manufacturers and consumers by means of ex ante
regulation. For example, the National Motor Vehicle Safety Administration ("NMVSA") could determine which safety devices are costjustified and which are not and then compel all those who sell motor
vehicles in the United States to include all cost-justified safety devices.
34
Failure to do so would expose the manufacturer and retailer to fines.
Whether by private law or by public law, the end is the same:

socially optimal automobiles. Society may choose whichever of the
policies seems more effective or cheaper. There may also be systemic
reasons for preferring one or the other form of regulation. For instance, private law works most effectively when victims bring actions
against their injurers and least effectively when victims do not bring
private causes of action. If there is some reason for believing that

victims of automobile accidents will not bring actions against manufacturers for the negligent design and manufacture of a car (as, for
example, might be the case if the costs of litigation are high or the
victims are fully insured), 3 5 then there is a relatively strong argument

for regulation through the NMVSA rather than through private
causes of action. But if one believes that regulatory agencies are sub-

ject to capture by those whom it seeks to regulate, so that the
NMVSA will operate not so much in the interest of producing safer
automobiles as in the interest of producing more profitable
automobiles, then there is a relatively stronger case for private causes
34. Many details and elaborations could be added to this sketch. One of the most important is whether or not compliance with the NMVSA regulations is a complete defense to a private cause of action against an automobile manufacturer for negligent design and manufacture.
35. However, I do not want to suggest that these factors necessarily interfere with the incentives of victims to bring private causes of action. For instance, while high litigation costs may
discourage some victims, they also encourage potential injurers to take care, on the theory that
additional precaution and the consequent lower number or severity of accidents are cheaper
than litigation. The net result may be no change in the quality and quantity of accidents. With
regard to insurance, the victim's incentive to bring an action is, of course, diminished by the
extent of his first-party insurance. However, it is in the interests of insurers to recover from
injurers who are liable. (If they can recover, their insurance rates will be lower.) Therefore,
most insurers have a subrogation clause entitling them to pursue any legal claim that their customers may have under the insurance contract. This may correct for the diminution in the victim's incentive to sue.
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of action as the principal guarantor of automobile safety. Finally, it is
worth remarking that the strongest case may be one that combines
administrative agency regulation and private liability so as to compensate for the deficiencies of each. 36 But that is a topic beyond the focus
of this Article.
For our present purposes, it is enough to have shown that public
law may correct market imperfections or high transaction costs. I
have suggested that the choice of private law, public law, or the market as a method of achieving social efficiency may be made according
to the same economic considerations that dictate all our other choices
in life. That is, there is nothing fundamentally different about public
law, compared to private law, as a means to achieve Pareto efficiency.

III.

THE GENERAL THEORY OF SECOND BEST IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS

In this section, I consider the implications of the General Theory
of Second Best for law and economics. First, I will show what the
theory holds and how economists have responded to it. That accomplished, I shall turn to consider how the theory applies to the economic analysis of law.
A.

The Theory's General Implicationsfor Economic Policy

We have seen that welfare economics identifies a limited set of
impediments to the attainment of social optima. Economists have always inferred that as a matter of policy, correcting market imperfections is always desirable. Because resources are limited, it would
generally be impossible to correct all the imperfections at once. But
such economic considerations would seem to suggest that social welfare would be advanced by correcting as many of the imperfections as
possible, and indeed, that we might be able to rank the many imperfections in the order in which society should try to correct them. Presumably this ranking would be done on economic principles, so that
the first imperfections corrected would be those for which the expected net increment in social welfare (i.e., the difference between the
marginal social benefit of the correction minus the marginal social
cost of correction) is greatest. Corrections would continue down the
list until the last corrective is reached-namely, that for which the
marginal social benefit of correction equals the marginal social cost.
36. See Kolstad et at., supra note 32, at 889.
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This happy picture of how to maximize social welfare by cotrecting market imperfections seriatim was challenged in the mid-1950s
by Professors Lipsey and Lancaster. In their famous article, they argued that in general, correcting a subset of market imperfections does
not necessarily improve social welfare. 37 For example, suppose that
there are 100 identifiable market imperfections. According to Lipsey
and Lancaster, and contrary to intuition, society would not necessarily
be better off (by comparison to the state of correcting none of the 100
imperfections) if it were to correct only the most egregious of those
imperfections. 38 No one doubts, and the theory demonstrates convincingly, that simultaneous correction of all the imperfections will
fulfill the conditions of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics. Nor does the literature seem to doubt that correction of
some of the 100 imperfections will make society better off.39 But no
one has demonstrated how or why this piecemeal correction will necessarily make society better off. It might improve things, but it might
not. Nor are the circumstances known under which piecemeal correction will be welfare-enhancing or welfare-decreasing. The daunting
conclusion is that economists can confidently recommend that some
societal imperfections or inefficiencies should be corrected only when
all of them are corrected at the same time. Partial correction may
make matters worse and should therefore perhaps not be undertaken.
The reasons for the results of the General Theory of Second Best
are technical and evident only to those with the patience for mathematical argument. 40 A clear, intuitive example of the theory is not a
staple of the microeconomic literature. So, the best I can do is to
sketch a sense of what the theory suggests. Return to the example of
100 imperfections. Suppose that the most glaring of these imperfections is the condition of monopoly in the supply of water. Intuition,
uninformed by the theory, would confidently predict that correcting
the distortions of the water monopoly would improve society. The
price of water would fall from a monopolistic to a competitive price,
with a consequent increase in the quantity of water demanded and
supplied. Other consequences would follow: those productive
37. See Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 2, at 17.
38. The proof of this assertion is complicated. I shall shortly give an example of why it
might be true.
39. The sad fact is that the profession has simply ignored this implication of the General
Theory. No one has disproved the theory; nor has anyone shown that there are circumstances in
which piecemeal corrective of market imperfections will improve matters. No economist today
feels obliged to say anything at allabout the matter.
40. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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processes that used water would find it cheaper and might, therefore,
experience an increase in profits, production, wages, or all three.
Consumers who had economized on the use of water at the monopoly
price would now be free to make wider use of it in many domestic
tasks, including cooking, washing, cleaning, and gardening. Taken all
together, these consequences of correcting the monopolistic distortion
in the water market would obviously seem to be a societal
improvement.
The theory holds that this obvious conclusion might be wrong.
Can we imagine circumstances in which the correction of that one
glaring imperfection might not improve social well-being? Consider
that the conversion of the water monopoly into a competitive supplier
may produce many losers. For instance, those firms who altered their
production processes away from the use of water because of the monopolistic price may find themselves with inappropriate production
technologies when the relative price of water falls. Those suppliers
who had designed, manufactured, marketed, sold, and maintained
equipment that economized on the use of water would now find their
market niche at risk. Their investments, and those of their customers,
in water-saving equipment would be in jeopardy. Consumers who had
relandscaped their lawns and gardens to minimize water use when its
price was relatively high might find their plantings inappropriate when
water is competitively priced. The sum of all the losses among those
who have made adjustments to monopoly water prices will not necessarily be greater than the sum of all the gains that would accrue to
those who would benefit from lower water prices. We must -at least
admit that possibility and see why it is that correcting a single, glaring
market imperfection might not necessarily make society better off.
Surely these are not the circumstances to which the General Theory of Second Best refers. The possibility that the losses from a
change could exceed the gains is nothing more than the application of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 4 or cost-benefit analysis. There is a world of
learning on what is likely to happen in circumstances in which gains
41. A change is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient when the gainers from the change could
compensate the losers and still be better off than they were before the change. The compensation does not have to be effectuated, only possible. For that reason, a Kaldor-Hicks change is
sometimes referred to as a "Pareto potential" change. Economists believe that the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion for evaluating changes in the economy is more flexible than the Pareto criterion, which
requires unanimity-i.e., the gainers must actually effectuate the payment to the losers. See
COOER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 41; MA-r-rHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, A DEFENSE OF
COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS (University of Pa. Sch. of Law Working Paper, 1998).
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and losses must be calibrated and balanced. 42 The theory must be
asking us to consider something more than merely toting up costs and
benefits of correcting market imperfections, laudable criterion though
that may be for evaluating changes. Although this has never been
entirely clear in the literature, my impression is that the theory
imagines that the piecemeal correction of market imperfections may
not result in a stable equilibrium, but rather in a series of adjustments
(some occurring in markets far removed from those in which the corrective is at issue), none of which is stable, and none of which is
clearly superior to another. In short, the theory holds that the correction of an imperfection in one market may lead to the creation of a
new imperfection or to the exacerbation of an existing imperfection in
another market. Piecemeal correction of market imperfections would
thus decrease, not increase, social welfare.
How might this apply in our example of the correction of the
water monopoly? Suppose that, as before, competitive prices replace
monopoly prices for water. Suppose, also as before, that some producers now make greater use of water because of the lower price. Specifically, suppose that a production process in which water is an
important input increases its output significantly because that important input is now cheaper. Finally, suppose that this particular production process pollutes the air and water around the factory and that
this particular market imperfection (the polluter's external costs) has
not yet been corrected (by, for example, forcing the polluter to internalize the external costs of production). 43 The increase in pollution
resulting from the increase in production, which itself resulted from
the correction of the water monopoly problem, might reduce social
welfare below its original level (i.e., before we corrected the monopoly problem). It is certainly possible that there may be many other
responses to lower water prices that result in new or exacerbated market imperfections. For instance, the increased use of water could lead
to an increase in irrigation by farmers, which could in turn cause an
increase in chemical pollution from water runoff; it is not impossible
to imagine that ending the water monopoly may create a monopoly
position for the supplier of some other input that is in scarce supply
and must be used in relatively fixed proportions with water. To the
42. Below I shall make a connection between this cost-benefit notion and the interpretation
that I am about to propound of what the General Theory of Second Best means.
43. If a system of effluent charges calibrated to the amount of external cost were already in
place, then the increase in the pollution attendant upon the increase in the amount of production
because of the now-cheaper water would be fully internalized.
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extent that the correction of the water monopoly may create new or
exacerbated imperfections elsewhere in the economy, the correction
of that one glaring imperfection in the supply of water clearly did not
necessarily increase social welfare. 44
Does this mean that our hands are tied, that we ought not correct
those imperfections that we can because of prudential fear that we
may be making things worse elsewhere? That is the central question
posed to us by the theory. If we take the theory seriously, then we
must pursue one of two policy courses. First, we may stay our hand
and make no attempts to correct market imperfections, knowing that
the cost society is bearing under these imperfections may be the best
state of affairs for which we can hope. Second, we can direct our efforts at the correction of only manageable imperfections: those that
are glaring, unlikely to have adverse consequences elsewhere, or
whose correction we may plausibly couple with the corrections of
other imperfections to avoid situations like that in which the correction of the water monopoly increases the external costs of air and
water pollution. But in order to be confident about these latter methods of dealing with piecemeal correction (and piecemeal it must be
because no society can afford to correct all imperfections at once), we
must be fairly confident that we have identified all the impacts in
other markets of making a correction in one market. That is, we
should be aware that adjusting the water monopoly will increase pollution (and incidents of other undesirable effects elsewhere) and take
the appropriate steps to implement optimal pollution-control policies.
One may be justly skeptical of the ability of economists and
others to identify all the second-best ramifications of market-imperfection correctives. Such skepticism is a significant point to which the
theory draws our attention: skepticism about global efficiency claims,
skepticism about claims that correction of market imperfections will
inevitability improve social welfare, and prudence about where we
44. Above I suggested that there was a difference between a cost-benefit analysis of the
effects of the piecemeal correction of market imperfections and second-best considerations.
There is, however, a connection between the two notions. The Coase Theorem might be read to
suggest that second-best considerations-by which I mean new or exacerbated imperfections
resulting from the correction of other market imperfections-are the result of high transaction
costs. If those costs were low, then those whose situation is worsened by the correction of, say,
the water monopoly-e.g., those who suffer harms from the increased water and air pollutionwould pay those who are making increased use of the now-cheaper water to cut back their usage
so as to reduce the pollution to tolerable levels. Only if it is too expensive for private parties to
reach these bargained-for corrections of the unintended consequences of market corrections will
there be the possibility of second-best effects.
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must look before we confidently recommend welfare-enhancing correctives of social problems.
B.

Second Best in Law and Economics

We turn now from the General Theory of Second Best in economic policy generally to its specific application in law and economics.
In this section I am not interested so much in what law and economics
should do in response to a recognition of the problem. That is the
topic of the following section. Here I want merely to show how second-best considerations might arise in some of the areas that we have
already considered as examples of the application of welfare economics to the analysis of the law.
1. Private law
In a previous section we looked at general examples of how private law could solve transaction-cost and market-imperfection
problems. Here I want to show how particular common law contract
doctrines designed to correct imperfections might have second-best
effects. Above we considered contract law generally as a method to
correct high transaction costs or market imperfections. Here I want to
consider a particular contract doctrine to show, first, how that doctrine specifically corrects for a market imperfection (or situation of
high transaction costs), and second and more importantly, how this
45
correction may give rise to second-best effects.
Standard-form contracts, offered on a "take-it or leave-it" basis,
may or may not be efficient. If the contract has terms to which the
parties themselves (say, A and B) would have agreed, had there been
time and low transaction costs, then the terms may be efficient. The
fact that it is a contract of adhesion is not inherently troubling because
bargaining can be, in some circumstances, a waste of resources. However, if A imposes the terms in a contract of adhesion on B because of
B's incompetence, or because of a severe informational asymmetry
running in favor of A, or because A has a monopoly position with
respect to B, then there is no reason to believe that the contract will
be efficient. These considerations suggest the advisability of a case45. I am grateful to my colleague Russell Korobkin for extensive discussions on the matters
of this section.
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by-case analysis of standard-form contracts with no general presump46
tion in favor of or against such contracts.
As an example, consider Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California.4 7 Mr. Tunkl sought admission to the University of California
at Los Angeles Medical Center in June, 1956. The Regents of the
University of California operated the hospital as a nonprofit charitable institution; they admitted patients if they believed that the study
and treatment of their illness would contribute to the medical research
and education mission of the UCLA School of Medicine. 48 As a condition of Mr. Tunkl's admittance, he signed a document that released
the "Regents of the University of California, and the hospital from
any and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of
its employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its employees."'49 When asked to execute this release, Mr. Tunkl "was in great
pain, under sedation, and probably unable to read. ' 50 Nonetheless, he
(or his agent) signed the release. He was admitted and treated, but
the medical treatment was unavailing, due, Mrs. Tunkl later complained, to the negligence of two physicians employed at the Medical
Center. After her husband's death, Mrs. Tunkl sued the hospital, the
trial court held the executed release to be valid, and it entered judg51
ment for the Regents.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the exculpation clause violated California Civil Code section 1668, which stated,
"All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury
to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."'5 2 The court recognized that exculpation clauses are generally valid "only if the public
interest is not involved, ' 53 and held that the hospital was a public interest enterprise: it was suitable to public regulation, it engaged in an
important and necessary public service, and willingly provided that
service to any member of the public Who sought it. 4 Moreover, the
hospital held a superior bargaining position with respect to Mr. Tunkl
46:
only in
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

The law seems to treat adhesion contracts as generally enforceable and unenforceable
certain circumstances. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 1990).
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (In Bank).
See id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442 n.1.
See id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443 n.6.
See id. at 445.
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and took advantage of that position to press the exculpation clause in
the contract of adhesion upon him without making "provision
whereby [he might] pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protec55
tion against negligence.1
The Regents defended the exculpation clause on two grounds.
First, they argued that while the exculpation clause might be void with
respect to paying patients, it should not be void with respect to charitable patients.5 6 The implicit economic justification for the Regent's
position is sound. The Regents could take charitable cases only if the
benefit of the study and treatment of their condition towards the hospital's educational and research mission exceeded the costs of treatment. One obvious method of keeping the cost of treatment down
was to insist on the exculpation clause. Without the exculpation
clause, the cost of treating charitable patients would rise, perhaps
higher than the benefits of treating them for educational and research
purposes, ultimately resulting in a decline in the number of charitable
patients treated. If the charitable patients would prefer treatment
under the exculpation clause to no treatment or to paying for the
treatment without the exculpation clause, then the contract term
would be mutually beneficial and, therefore, efficient. These arguments did not impress the California Supreme Court. The court felt
that it would be unwise to treat patients differently with respect to
exculpation clauses according to whether they were paying or charitable patients.57
Second, and closely related to the first point, the Regents argued
that the real purpose of the exculpation clause was to protect the hospital's employees. If the hospital could not immunize its employees
from liability, it would be difficult for the hospital to put together a
competent staff, particularly in a nonprofit, charitable teaching and
research hospital. Competent staff would have sought employment in
hospitals where they could be immunized from liability; otherwise,
they would demand higher compensation to work in nonprofit charitable institutions that could not issue exculpation clauses. The court rejected this argument, too, as contrary to public policy.58
Perhaps the court hoped that the decision in Tunkl would serve to
induce future parties to craft more efficient contracts. The default
rule-indeed, an immutable rule-became this: nonprofit charitable
55. Id. at 446.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 448.
58. See id.
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hospitals could not insist on the patient's signing an exculpation clause
as a condition of admission to the hospital. 59 As with all common law
rules, the additional circumstances to which this disfavor of exculpation clauses extended was not then clear but would be revealed only
through future litigation. But the effects may have been widespread.
Counsel to clients in other businesses that provided services that could
affect the public interest might have advised their clients that they too
could not ask their customers to sign exculpation clauses. One cannot
be sure how much further the ripples of Tunkl spread.
Let us concede, for the sake of further argument, that the court's
decision to void exculpation clauses like the one presented to Mr.
Tunkl was efficient in the sense that it corrected an imperfection or a
situation of high transaction costs in the market for medical services. 6°
The imperfection lay in the exercise by the hospital of its situational
monopoly (Mr. Tunkl, recall, was in pain, had been sedated, and was
temporarily unable to read) or in the exploitation of a severe informational asymmetry about the risks and costs of medical negligence (if
Mr. Tunkl had been able to bargain). Alternatively, one might characterize the situation as one of generally high transaction costs: the
costs to patients of informing themselves about the risks of malpractice, and alternative methods of protecting themselves against those
risks, may be so high as to prevent patients from effectively bargaining
with hospitals. One might suppose that the court's holding duplicates
the contract terms that the parties themselves would have bargained
to if transaction costs had been low.
Suppose that, as a result of the ruling in Tunkl, the efficiency with
which nonprofit charitable hospitals deliver health care services increases. Unable to impose exculpation clauses upon their admittees,
the hospital minimizes its potential liability by paying more attention
to those whom it hires and to the quality of the services it provides to
its patients, thus decreasing the number of iatrogenic injuries. 6 1 The
59. See, e.g., Maxwell Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on BargainingBetween
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PIr. L. REV. 365, 401-03 (1990); Frank J. Vandall,
Applying Strict Liability to Professionals:Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 61 &
n.256 (1983).
60. I ask for this concession because I am not certain that these clauses are efficiency-enhancing. However, for the purposes of explicating second-best effects in the common-law context, the true efficiency characteristics of the clause are not that important. For an interesting,
economically sophisticated, and persuasive defense of the exculpation clause, see RICHARD A.
EPsTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 372-76 (1997); Glen 0.
Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical MalpracticeRisks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 188-95 (1986).

61. One might argue that the exculpation clause constitutes a form of moral hazard for the
hospital and its physicians: relieved of the possibility of being held liable, they may take less care
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patients of the hospitals would be relieved of the costs of providing for
their own protection against medical malpractice. Formerly, when patients bore those costs, they may not have used hospitals as much as
they should have, with adverse consequences for their health. Indeed,

patients bore more of the costs of health care than they should have
and therefore may have postponed going to the doctor or the hospital
until their illness had progressed considerably. By the time they took

themselves to the hospital, they were in a more deteriorated state of
health than they would have been had they gone earlier in the illness
and, as a result, it was more expensive to treat them. If there had
been no exculpation clause, patients might have been willing to go to
the hospital earlier, when the costs of treating ther would presumably
have been lower. All of these inefficiencies would be avoided if excul-

pation clauses were not allowed.
The General Theory of Second Best asks us to look beyond these
efficiency gains to ask if this corrective adversely affects other market

efficiencies (or transaction costs among private bargainers). If this
corrective does have those second-best effects elsewhere, then social
welfare may not have increased. To confine our attention to the issue
of second-best effects, I shall continue to assume that the decision in
62
Tunkl was efficiency-enhancing in the ways described above.

What second-best effects might there be, in other markets, from
this (assumed) improvement in the hospital services market? Suppose
that voiding exculpation clauses in admissions agreements to non-

profit charitable hospitals raises the costs of treating charitable patients (relative to those of treating paying patients) at research and
educational hospitals. (This, recall, is not inefficient; by assumption,
this is the socially optimal cost of treatment.) Consequently, the hosin patient treatment than they otherwise would or than social welfare would dictate. If so, then
the unavailability of the exculpation clause brings the possibility of malpractice liability more
forcefully to bear on the hospital and physicians and induces them to take more precaution-by
assumption, a socially efficient amount of precaution.
62. To make the matter tractable, we must make an additional assumption. We do not
know how far the ruling in Tunkl spread-whether or not, that is, other businesses interpreted
the holding to mean that they, too, should not offer contracts of adhesion with exculpation
clauses to their customers. If this was the response (as it surely was), then whatever second-best
effects we can identify as a result of changes in the hospital market would be amplified by
changes in those other markets where the exculpation clause was now void. Trying to consider
the collateral effects in other markets that responded to Tunki by dropping their exculpation
clauses would make things complicated. To remove this complication, let us assume that the
immediate effects of the holding are confined to nonprofit charitable hospitals. I think that it is
fair to say that if we were to consider ripple effects of the Tunkl holding on other businesses
affected with a public interest, the second-best effects that I am about to describe would be
exacerbated, strengthening my ultimate point.
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pital admits fewer charitable patients or cuts back on its staff. Ultimately, the result may be that, because a smaller range of patients
appear in the educational and research hospitals, the opportunities for
improvements in medical treatment decrease or the quality of medical
education falls. Perhaps another response to the correction of the exculpation-clause imperfection is that the compensation of physicians
in nonprofit charitable hospitals falls relative to their compensation
elsewhere. Fewer physicians may decide to go into medical research
and education, reducing the opportunities for new discoveries.
The external costs flowing from these (and other) outcomes of
correcting the exculpation-clause imperfection in nonprofit charitable
hospitals could be extraordinarily large. Assume for the moment that
these reductions in the amount of medical research or in the rate of
improvement in medical treatment are the only second-best, welfaredecreasing effects that follow from Tunkl. How can society guarantee
that voiding the exculpation clause is welfare-enhancing? Clearly, on
these assumptions, Tunkl's rule should have been accompanied by an
increase in the public subsidy given to educational and research hospitals. 63 That increase-or some equivalent policy, such as a change in
the tax treatment of revenues or expenditures At nonprofit hospitalswould have offset the deleterious side effects of correcting the inefficiencies of the exculpation clause. Generally speaking, the efficiencycorrecting aspects of private-law rules may create inefficiencies in
other markets, requiring supplemental legal attention.
2.

Public law

Health-care markets also help to illustrate the possibility of second-best effects in public law attempts to correct market imperfections or high-transaction-cost impediments to social optimality. One
of the most notable developments in health-care markets of the last
fifteen or so years is the spread of managed care. Managed care is
offered in many different forms, 64 and in those different forms covers
63. There are, of course, other policy instruments that could have been implemented to
correct for the decline in the production of socially valuable medical information-such as income tax breaks for physicians willing to work in nonprofit charitable hospitals.
Recall that I have assumed that other businesses, besides nonprofit charitable hospitals, did
not respond to Tunkl by dropping exculpation clauses from their contracts with customers. To
the extent that other businesses affected with a public interest did take TunkI as a warrant for
correcting their own behavior, the second-best effects are likely to be magnified beyond those I
have identified.
64. See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominanceof Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the
1990s, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 126, 126 (1997) (finding that, in 1995, 28% of employees were covered by HMOs, 25% by PPOs, and 20% by POSs).
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some 65 million Americans. 65 The principal factor motivating the reorganization of health-care markets into managed-care enterprises is
an attempt to lower costs while maintaining a high quality of healthcare services. 66 In their attempts to do this, managed-care hospitals
have been altering the manner in which some services are delivered.
For example, some patients are spending less time in the hospital than
has heretofore been customary, 67 some treatments that had previously
been offered almost exclusively on an in-patient basis are now being
offered more and more on an out-patient basis, and some forms of
treatment are changing dramatically.
These changes in the health care market have caused some to
wonder if managed-care enterprises are taking advantage of their patients. 68 Managed-care facilities have treatment protocols that may
leave less scope for individual patient variation, less flexibility for physicians in their treatment options, and may disadvantage patients in
their dealings with the managed-care enterprises because the terms of
their agreement with the facilities are so complex and multi-faceted
that no patient has the ability to understand them.

69

In response, many states have sought to restructure the managedcare arrangement with their physicians and their patients by statute.
For example, the Illinois General Assembly has debated a "bill of
rights" for managed-care patients and has mandated certain treatments by managed-care enterprises, such as a forty-eight-hour stay after a radical mastectomy. 70 Connecticut recently passed a statute that
65. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Allowing Suits Against H.M.O.'s, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1997, at A16.
66. See Paul B. Ginsburg, The Dynamics of Market-Level Change, 22 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'V & L. 363 (1997).
67. Post-natal stays are generally shorter in managed-care facilities than they are in other
kinds of facilities. See Tracy Wilson Smirnoff, Note, "Drive-Through Deliveries": Indiscriminate
PostPartum Early DischargePractices Presently Necessitate Legislation Mandating Minimum Inpatient Hospital Stays, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 231, 235 (1997) (reporting that a higher percentage
of women with HMO coverage are discharged within 24 hours of giving birth than are women
with non-HMO coverage). As has become well-known, post-operative stays for some procedures, such as a radical mastectomy, are shorter than has been the case previously.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Pedoza, Note, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners,Health Care Delivery
and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 399, 411 (1996).
69. For a discussion of these alleged problems in managed-care plans, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 60, at 420 (discussing the decline of the traditional physician-patient relationship in managed care), 422-33 (discussing patient-physician conflicts in managed care), 426-28 (discussing
how patient complaints with managed care may result in legislative action), and sources cited
therein.
70. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356t (West 1997).
The provisions of the proposed Illinois "bill of rights" for managed-care patients, introduced

as The Managed Care Patient Rights Act, H.B. 603, 90"' General Assembly, Regular Session (Ill.
1997), are identical to those of other state regulatory plans. For example, it bans "gag orders"
that prevent doctors from telling patients about different treatment options, see id. § 5-25, re-
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allows patients to appeal grievances with their managed-care providers to a state arbitration panel, largely at state expense. 71 Congress is
also proposing to impose constraints on the ability of managed-care
72
providers to alter the services they provide.
quires managed-care providers to respond within three hours to a doctor's request to extend a
patient's stay in the facility (with failure-to-respond to be construed as approval), see id. § 5-45,
and mandates that consumers be covered for emergency room visits, even if the consumer turns
out to have no serious medical problem but had reasonable cause for concern for her health, see
id.
71. See CONN. GEN. ST. ANN. § 38a-214 to 226d (West 1997). The Connecticut act contains
many of the same provisions as those of the Illinois legislation. The novel aspect of the Connecticut statute is the appeals process. After appealing a dispute about coverage through three tiers
of the managed-care system, patients may then appeal to a state panel of impartial medical
professionals. The appellant will pay only $25 for the appeal to that arbitral panel, and the State
picks up any additional expenses. See id. § 226b. Senator Anthony D'Amato and Representative Charles Norwood (R-NY) have introduced legislation in Congress to require similar appeals
processes as a matter of federal law. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Connecticut Seeks to Appeal
Managed Health Care Denials, N.Y. TMsS, May 22, 1997, at Al.
72. See, e.g., Managed Care Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 337, 105th Cong.
(1997); Managed Care Plan Accountability Act of 1997, H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997); Patient
Protection Act of 1997, S. 346, 105th Cong. (1997).
A particularly apt example of a legislatively enabled private law remedy comes from a recent statute passed by the Texas legislature. In early June, 1997, Texas passed a statute that
would allow medical malpractice actions against health maintenance organizations ("HMOs").
See TEX. Cxv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (West 1997); see also Sam Howe Verhovek,
Texas Allowing Suits Against H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A16. Texas thereby became
the first state to allow malpractice or negligence actions against HMOs. See Frank Bass, HMOs
in Texas to Be Made Liable for Malpractice,WALL. ST. J., May 23, 1997, at B12. Thus far, HMOs
have been able to avoid state common law liability on the theory that they do not practice
medicine, but merely administer insurance policies. As HMOs and other managed-care providers increasingly specify particular procedures as a means of keeping costs down, they come
closer and closer to practicing medicine. Those patients who have successfully sued managedcare providers have generally done so on a "breach of contract" theory. See Allison Faber
Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost ContainmentMechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 228-32 (1997).
The HMOs opposed the legislation and argued that it would drive up their premiums by 4.5 to
12%. See Verhovek, supra, at A16. The Texas Medical Association, representing physicians,
supported the bill on the theory that there was no reason that they should be liable for medical
malpractice while the managed-care providers for whom they worked escape liability. See id.
The Florida legislature passed a similar bill several years ago, but Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed the act, citing concerns about its impact on costs of the health care services.
There is uncertainty about the extent to which Texas HMOs will succeed in avoiding liability
by seeking removal of actions against them to federal courts. According to a somewhat controversial interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ § 1001-1461 (1994) ("ERISA"), ERISA shields those HMOs that are at least partially paid for
by a worker's employer from negligence and malpractice actions. See ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B);
see also Walsh, supra, at n.93. Compare Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA § 514(a), which provides for federal preemption of state laws
that "relate to any employee benefit plan," preempted state tort suit), with Dukes v. United
States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding no preemption of state tort suit). For
another example of ERISA preemption of state statutory health-care regulation, see Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4 t h Cir. 1993), where a Virginia
hospital argued that Aetna violated the Virginia Code § 38.2-3407 by failing to select it as a
provider facility. See Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 501. The court held that ERISA preempted
enforcement of the state statute. See id. at 502.
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Can these statutes altering the terms and conditions of managedcare contracts be construed as correctives for market imperfections or
high transaction costs? I believe that many of them can, but need not
debate that issue here. As in our examples of common law holdings,
let us presume that these acts regulating managed care do correct inefficiencies that the parties involved could not themselves correct. 73
The neglected question upon which I want to focus is this: are there
second-best effects from these regulations?
There may well .be. That is, after all, the contention of the General Theory of Second Best, and it is a contention that everyone who
purports to correct a market imperfection ought to take seriously.
This is not to say that every correction has second-best effects or that,
where there are second-best effects, they necessarily exceed the social
benefit of the correction. One merely needs to be alive to the possibility that second-best effects may exist and may be substantial. This
observation leaves open the question of whether or not we might do
more than merely stay alive for the presence of second-best effects.
That question is the focus of the next section.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE CHOICE
OF INSTITUTION TO CONSIDER SECOND-BEST EFFECTS

We are now in a position to elaborate on how law and economics
ought to take account of the General Theory of Second Best. I shall
focus on two particular effects: 1) how scholars in the field ought to
take account of second-best considerations, and, more importantly, 2)
how we ought to take account of second-best effects in the field's analysis of the relative desirability of private litigation and legislation as
correctives for inefficiencies.
Law-and-economics scholars, like economists generally, have not
paid sufficient attention to the General Theory of Second Best as an
important constraint on the piecemeal, seriatim analysis of efficiency
that is the convention in the field. 74 Analysts should be aware that an
efficient rule in one area of the law may create or exacerbate inefficiencies elsewhere in the legal system or the economy. This does not
73. I recognize that this is a particularly strong presumption in this context because the
political element-by which I mean the ability of competing interest groups to frame and push
the legislative process on any issue-is so strong. Interest groups are not so often interested in
seeing to it that the legislature corrects market imperfections or lowers transaction costs as they
are in transferring resources towards themselves.
74. But for the work of Professor Markovits, there has been very little attention to the topic
of Second Best. For an exception, see Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Uneasy Case for a Lower
Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the Second Best?, 48 TAx NoTEs 195 (1990).
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mean that second-best effects are everywhere. Sometimes they are
present and large, sometimes they are present but small, and at other
times they are non-existent. At a minimum, we ought to look for
them routinely. But we ought to try to do more. Specifically, lawand-economics scholars should seek to develop a more general framework for identifying second-best effects. That is, we should seek to
find theoretical regularities, such as the hypothetical possibility that
tort rules are far more likely to produce second-best effects than contract rules, or that second-best effects are more pervasive in certain
kinds of correctives (such as those for public goods, say, by comparison to those for monopoly), or that those effects are more likely to
75
appear in public law than in private law areas.
There is a further, and I believe more important, implication of
the General Theory of Second Best for law and economics: the choice
of legal institution for dealing with inefficiencies. If we assume that
there are instances of rule-creation in private litigation that give rise
to second-best effects, we must then ask whether or not a common law
court should take some account of those effects in resolving private
disputes. The answer is, almost certainly not. Courts should not, and
indeed, they do not do this. Their competency is limited by the arguments of the parties before them in light of legal precedent and social
custom. Common law judges create rules incrementally and cautiously; in so doing, they focus on the local effects of the rule. By
contrast, if common law judges were to take into account second-best
effects, perhaps effects far removed from the instant controversy, they
would be looking at global effects and doing so without the benefit of
specific argument to guide them on the matter. Courts almost never
do this; when they do, they are often accused of overreaching, or "legislating" from the bench. One of the unexpected consequences of the
theory is this insight into the limited province of adjudication as a
method of creating rules to correct inefficiencies. In sum, private litigation is not now, and should not become, a method of taking secondbest effects into account.
In contrast, legislation, when it seeks to correct inefficiencies,
does so in a context that allows for the explicit consideration of second-best effects. Legislators might discover these effects themselves,
75. It is not at all farfetched to suggest that law-and-economics scholars, rather than economists, will tackle this problem. Consider the work that is being done on rational choice theory.
Law and economics has taken a far deeper interest in probing and amending the rationality
assumption than has conventional economics. For a survey, see Thomas S. Ulen, Rational
Choice Theory and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 487 (1994).
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but more likely, they will learn of them from their interested constituents. The groups who track legislation have a strong incentive to identify second-best effects (as well as other effects) and to lobby
legislators to account for such effects in legislation. I am fully aware
that legislation is subject to imperfections of its own (as noted in the
extensive public choice literature), 76 but at its best, Congress (and
state legislatures) can most ably account for second-best effects.
Legislators are particularly adept at structuring statutes to minimize the social-welfare decreasing aspects of those effects. I do not
mean that legislators are philosopher-kings. Rather, the political process is, relative to the process of private litigation, open and comprehensive. A far broader spectrum of interests can be heard and
accommodated in legislation than in private litigation. Thus, parties
both immediately and tangentially affected by any proposed efficiency-enhancing action contemplated by the legislature will have an
opportunity to make their position known in the legislative forum.
Recall the hypothetical effects of the Tunkl decision on medical education and innovation. The Regents of the University of California
could have raised those matters in defense of the exculpation clause,
but surely the California Supreme Court would have, quite rightly,
dismissed those concerns as remote from the instant controversy,
speculative, or beyond their competence. By contrast, if the California General Assembly had debated making exculpation clauses illegal,
then the Regents and every other group that thought it might be adversely or positively affected would be on notice to make its views
known to the legislature. Presumably, the legislators could then weigh
these competing views and amend the legislation as they deemed appropriate. Put more concisely, the stronger the second-best effects of
any proposed corrective legislation, the greater the likelihood that
some interest group, eager to guard against those socially undesirable
but unintended consequences of the proposed legislation, will seek to
affect the legislation. I suggest here that the legislative process, precisely in the jostling among competing interests that occurs every time
legislatures propose to take action, offers an opportunity for secondbest effects to be incorporated explicitly.
These brief considerations of relative institutional competence
with respect to second-best effects suggest that law and economics, in
76. See e.g., DANIEL A.
(1991);
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FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITIJERRY L. MAsWAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE (1997);

MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY

(1997).
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choosing between private law and legislation in correcting inefficien77
cies, should add another factor to those that it has already identified:
private law is more appropriate than legislation for addressing inefficiencies when second-best effects are trivial; legislation is more appropriate than private law for addressing inefficiencies when second-best
effects may be large and widely distributed. Perhaps the division of
responsibility between private adjudication and legislation already reflects this point. Put somewhat differently, it is possible that the discernible trend towards an increasing scope for statutory law and a
narrowing scope for private law reflects either a broader (but unarticulated) recognition of second-best effects, or a secular increase in
the extent of second-best effects. 78 We cannot carefully evaluate the
current division of responsibility between public and private law because we lack an understanding of the circumstances in which secondbest effects are most extensive. Until we have a better theoretical and
empirical grasp on those circumstances, we shall have to exercise our
79
best judgment in deciding how best to deal with inefficiencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

Law and economics is a straightforward application of traditional
welfare economic theory to legal rules and institutions. Economic

analysts perceive the need for legal rules, both generally and in particular, to correct market imperfections such as monopoly, public goods,
external costs and benefits, severe informational asymmetries, or the
presence of high transaction costs that prevent parties from bargaining
to mutually beneficial gains. Analysts seek to identify those rules and
institutions that would enhance social welfare in consensual agree-

ments, the use of resources, or in the taking of precaution. The implicit assumption is that correctives that lead to more efficient
77. See Ko~msA, supra note 31.
78. The law-and-economics literature typically stresses normative factors for the secular increase in statutory law, not the positive factor to which I have drawn attention. See STEARNS,
supra note 76; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 72-80
(1985).
79. I leave for another day the possibility that social norms may address second-best effects
and, if they do, how we might choose among private adjudication, legislation, and social norms
as the most appropriate device for minimizing second-best effects. There is an extraordinary
law-and-economics literature on the efficiency of social norms. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623
(1986); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 92 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLuM. L. Rv. 903 (1996); Symposium,
Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
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resource use or more efficient consensual agreements do not elsewhere adversely impact the legal system or economy.
The General Theory of Second Best, however, holds that correction for one market imperfection will not necessarily be efficiencyenhancing unless we also simultaneous correct for all other market
imperfections. This is because one correction may have unintended
and unanticipated consequences that adversely impact market efficiency or transaction costs elsewhere. Applying that theory to the
analysis of legal rules suggests the possibility that, for instance, a contract rule that corrects for an imperfection in the market for consensual agreements may induce welfare losses elsewhere.
The recognition of this possibility should give scholars, and practitioners pause. The possibility of second-best effects should temper
claims of general efficiency within the legal system. Because we are
unlikely to perceive all the second-best effects of legal rules, we ought
to be content to see only as far as we can and make more circumspect
claims about the efficiency-enhancing aspects of our economic analysis of legal rules and institutions.
There are clearer implications of Second Best Theory for judges
and legislators. Because common law judges have a relatively modest
social mandate to make law, even those who are aware of second-best
effects that might flow from their holdings should, nonetheless, confine themselves to considerations of local optimality. Common law
holdings that seek to incorporate second-best concerns overreach. By
contrast, legislators are in a position to inquire into the broadest possible social consequences of their actions-i.e., to take second-best effects into account. Typically, because of their sensitivity to political
issues, legislators do pay attention to second-best effects. These observations suggest that in the division of responsibility between common law courts and legislatures, an additional factor to consider is
this: to enhance welfare society should assign jurisdiction to common
law courts over those matters for which there are no or few secondbest effects and assign jurisdiction to legislatures over those matters
for which there are or may be extensive second-best effects.

